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Abstract: The social contract approach to the study if institutions aims at providing
a solution to the problem of compliance with rational agreements in situations char-
acterized by a conﬂict between individual rationality and social optimality. After a
short discussion of some attempts to deal with this problem from a rational choice
perspective, we focus on John Rawls's idea of `sense of justice' and its application
to the explanation of the stability of a well-ordered society. We show how the rele-
vant features of Rawls's theory can be captured by a behavioral game theory model of
beliefs-dependent dispositions to comply, and we present the results of two experimen-
tal studies that provide support to the theory.
1. Introduction and Motivations
1.1 The Compliance Problem
The social contract perspective seems appropriate for appreciating the problem
of norm (and institutions) compliance. In fact, the social contract approach
maintains that norms and institutions must be based on the consensus and vol-
untary compliance of those regulated by the norm itself. The idea of a rational
agreement (i.e. the social contract) must thus be simultaneously developed in
two directions: on the one hand, it must work as a justiﬁcation by giving reasons
for agreeing on the norm or institutional rule from an impartial and impersonal
standpoint; on the other, the same idea must have direct implications for per-
sonal incentives and motivations to comply with the norm in practice. In a `state
of nature', namely a situation of pre-institutional strategic interaction, the norm
can be implemented only if the agreement is self-enforceable. In other words,
the social contract can resort to no other means of implementation than those
which the agreement is able to induce by itself.
David Gauthier clariﬁes that these two directions pose two separate choice
problems, with clearly not concomitant rationality tests, that a contractarian ex-
planation of norms and institutions must nevertheless overcome simultaneously
and consistently (see Gauthier 1986, 1168):
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a) The entry into agreement problem (internal rationality): all individuals,
when deciding whether to enter an agreement on the institution of a norm,
perform a rationality assessment on whether the norm will enable them
to escape from a reciprocally unproﬁtable interaction and permit them
to initiate a mode of mutually beneﬁcial cooperative interaction. This
point of view requires internal rationality because it views the agreement
from within the perspective of cooperative bargainingwhich takes it for
granted that if an agreement is reached, it will be implemented to the
mutual advantage of the participants. Hence no ex post decision (after
entrance) is relevant here. On the contrary, this case requires that entering
the agreement ex ante may be recognized as mutually beneﬁcial. Rational
bargaining takes place in situations where there is some feasible surplus to
be distributed amongst the individual participants, granted that they are
able to reach an agreement. But there are too many agreements possible:
some of them preferred by one party, others by another. A bargaining
game is a way to solve this coordination problem before the cooperative
game is played whereby the agreed joint strategy is executed in order to
produce and allocate the cooperative surplus.
b) The compliance problem (external rationality): when we move from the
ex ante to the ex post perspective, we ask whether an agreement reached
can also be complied with by the same players who agreed on it. This
is a diﬀerent problem because the game-logic of compliance diﬀers from
that of entering a bargain in a cooperative game. It is instead the logic
of an ex post non-cooperative game in which the players decide separately
but interdependently whether or not to comply with the ex ante agreed
contract. From this perspective, the question is not so much whether
the contract provides reasonably high joint beneﬁts and distributes them
in an acceptably fair way; rather, the question is mainly whether there
are incentives for cheating on the counterparty to the agreement, given
the expectation that s/he will abide by the contract. Thus, according to
Gauthier, the search for external rationality must address the problem of a
potential divorce between individual rationality (expected personal utility
maximisation) and social optimality (i.e. Pareto eﬃciency), a divorce which
is instantiated by the typical Prisoner's Dilemma game
Impartiality within a contractarian framework amounts to no more than a con-
dition of invariance for the ex ante acceptance of a given bargaining outcome,
which means acceptance from the viewpoint of each and all (under the permuta-
tion of personal standpoints allowing the impartial decision-maker to take each
player's point of view in turn). By contrast, compliance is the typical sphere in
which ex post (personal, not impersonal and impartial) rationality is required. In
the compliance problem, separate but interdependent strategy choices are under
consideration, and the players are always able to say whether or not they want
to implement the agreement given their prediction of the other player's decision
whether or not to comply with it. It follows that the main problem to be solved
in the compliance context is how a norm can also generate motivational causal
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forces strong enough to induce the execution of the norm in situations where it
may require a prima facie counter-interested behaviour by the agent at least in
the immediate term.
Justiﬁcations in themselves do not answer questions about compliance. This
is because the agent's standpoint in the justiﬁcation context is neutral, i.e. de-
tached from the particular personal perspective of each concrete agent (be this an
individual or an artiﬁcial actor like the corporation or its board of directors). In
the implementation context, reasons for action are instead agent-relative (Nagel
1986). They reﬂect intentions, motivational drives and preferences which the
agent holds simply because he is that particular agent in that particular decision
position. This simple condition of realism suggests that the eﬀectiveness of a
norm consists in the fact that, by implementing the norm, the agent will also
pursue his preferences in a rational manner (in the sense of coherence amongst
preferences and between preferences and actions). It admits both the view that
complying can be a means to fulﬁl preferences (instrumental view) and that the
norm itself may inﬂuence preference formation (intrinsic view).
Assume, however, that preferences are typically consistent with the model of
self-interested rational individual choice and that, following a large part of the
rational-choice literature on the emergence of institutions (Gauthier included),
the Hobbesian `state of nature' is modelled like a Prisoners' Dilemma (PD)
game. Assuming a PD-like state of nature seems natural if one's goal is to make
evident the need for the social contract. It results in a pragmatic necessity in so
far as it is a rational means for exiting a mutually destructive `state of nature'
which inevitably entails a suboptimal solution of the rational and egoistic non-
cooperative interaction amongst players. Since the individually rational non-
cooperative mode of interaction necessarily engenders a suboptimal outcome,
in order to escape from this outcome it is a pragmatical necessity explicitly to
agree on a diﬀerent (mutually cooperative) mode of behaviour and outcome. The
Hobbesian `state of nature' is perfectly captured in the PD-logic. The necessary
suboptimal solution of the game, consisting in the unique equilibrium outcome
in dominant strategies, corresponds to the idea of a necessary `war of all against
all'.
However, this argument on the logical consequentiality of the state of nature
suboptimal outcome is also what makes the compliance problem in the social
contract perspective apparently insolvable. If the game within which players
must decide to comply with the social contract is a PD, as seems unavoidable
if the `state of nature' wherein they are embedded is a PD, then the social
contract will obviously not be complied with, since non-compliance (naturally
corresponding to mutual defection) is the only equilibrium point. And this
diﬃculty cannot be overcome by proceeding to the second step in the argument,
where the social contract includes delegation of authority to one party in the
agreement to enforce the contract. Agreeing and complying with the social
contract, and hence accepting to conform with any authority directives (which
is the content of the contract and consists in legitimizing authority by agreement)
is again a deal that should be struck and respected within a PD situation. But
according to the PD-logic, compliance with this authority-delegation agreement
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(i.e. cooperating in the PD) cannot be consistent with individual incentives to
act. Thus players may agree ex ante in `cheap talk' to relinquish their complete
freedom and submit to an authority by accepting its directives. But as a matter
of fact they will not transfer their `natural' capability to act to the delegated
authorityi.e. they will not fulﬁl the cheap-talk promise to comply with the
authority directives. Thus, once the implementation stage has been reached,
authority will vanish.
Here the compliance problem takes a particularly marked form which we call
`contractarian compliance impossibility'. The problem can be stated as follows:
assume that a PD-theory of the `state of nature' provides the complete theory
of the social contract, i.e. a complete description of the choice situation wherein
a social contract is to be complied with. Thus, keeping the social contract
cannot be consistent with the premises concerning a rational solution of this
type of game. In other words, social contract compliance is not a theorem
that can be deduced from a PD-theory of the state of nature. Then, by freely
rephrasing the famous Gödel incompleteness theorem, if the PD theory of social
contract is complete it must be inconsistent. On the contrary, let us require
that the social contract (including compliance with it) is consistent with the
premises on rational action in the choice situation (the state of nature). In
other words, it should be a theorem of the theory designed to give a solution
to the game understood as the formal model of the `state of nature' situation.
Hence the PD cannot be a complete description of the choice situation. Some
additional features of the game must be added to the representation of the
state of nature, which by itself necessitates a suboptimal solution of the non-
cooperative interaction played by selﬁsh and rational players.
But of course if the game description and assumptions are wider than a PD,
the necessity of a suboptimal solution of the state of nature interaction that
highlights the need for a social contract is no longer guaranteed. Otherwise,
it should be shown howgiven the non-cooperative PD game that players are
doomed to play in the `state of nature' if they avoid entering the social contract
having considered the cooperative decision to enter the social contract (an ex
ante justiﬁcatory decision), this mental experiment of justiﬁcation will change
the nature itself of the ex post compliance problem and the structure of the
corresponding game (as we will consider in this article).
1.2 Ways Out of the Compliance Problem: Nash Equilibria
The diﬃculty of the compliance problem is signiﬁcantly reduced if norms and
institutions are viewed from the conventionalist perspective (Hume 2000[1740];
Lewis 1969; Sugden 1986; Aoki 2001). Conventions are regularities of behavior
that give solution to coordination games repeatedly played by (at least) pairs of
players in a given population. A regularity of behavior is a convention if players,
who are all following the regularity, are characterized by a system of mutually
consistent expectations regarding actions and beliefs such that (i) each player
correctly expects that any other player will follow the regularity, and also ex-
pects that other players correctly expect that s/he will follow the regularity; (ii)
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these expectations are common knowledgei.e. everybody knows that every-
body knows. . . that everybody have the expectations that all players will follow
the regularity; (iii) given these expectations each player prefers to follow the
regularity of behavior (since it is the solution of a coordination problem), and
this interest is also common knowledge.
Under these conditions, compliance reduces to a trivial problem since con-
ventions are Nash equilibria, and intrinsic to the deﬁnition of a Nash equilibrium
is that it is a strategy vector such that no player having a component in it has
any incentive to change his/her strategy in order to deviate from the behavior
consistent with the strategy vector. Moreover, conventions are Nash equilibria
endowed with the conditions that make it individually rational for each player to
play exactly his/her strategy pertaining to a given equilibrium. In fact, common
knowledge of the game solution entails that the solution cannot but be a Nash
equilibrium (otherwise, by knowing the solution every players would deviate from
it, thus destroying the solution itself: see Luce and Raiﬀa 1957). Thus, in so
far as players commonly know that a given Nash equilibrium is the solution of
the game, each of them cannot play any strategy other than his/her component
of the given equilibrium. But conventions are exactly situations where agents
commonly know that a given regularity, which is a coordination equilibrium, is
being followed by all the agents. Thus nobody has any incentive to deviate from
it.
An important aspect of conventions is the idea of a many-level systems of
mutually concordant expectations, which is considered to be one of main the rea-
sons why agents comply with a rule. According to such a system, players expect
reciprocation of compliance with a rule, and they also expect that reciprocation
is mutually expected. But, as clariﬁed by Lewis's deﬁnition, mutual beliefs of
reciprocation of the same behavior are not per se reasons for compliance. An
independent reason in term of instrumental rational choice is needed. Under
mutual expectations of reciprocity, compliance must consist in a best response
in terms of independently deﬁned individual payoﬀs. It is true that after a con-
vention has been working for some time as a successful coordination mechanism
of the players' choices, a reason per se for continuing reciprocation may spring
from the simple awareness of mutual expectation of compliance (Sugden 1986;
1998b; Bicchieri 2006). But this comes only after a convention has emerged,
and it presupposes that all players basically know (or at least have known in
the past) that playing according to the rule of behavior is an instrumental best
response given their mutually consistent expectations and belief systems.
How far do conventions extend their domain of application? There is no
reason for limiting the latter only to cases of pure coordination. It can be
conveniently extended to cover mixed motives coordination problems (Sudgen
1998). But it is certainly beyond the reach of convention theory to give a solution
to the compliance problem as it was modelled in the social contract perspective,
i.e. to assure compliance with agreements capable of solving PD-like interactions.
The reason is simple. The aim of the social contract perspective is to provide
a solution to compliance problems in situationslike the Prisoners' Dilemma
or the Trust Game (TG)in which there is a divorce between individual self-
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interested rationality and social optimality. In a TG, for example, the trustor
cannot trust the trustee in equilibrium, because after the former has entered into
a relation with the latter, the latter's best response is to abuse the former's trust
by defecting from the mutually beneﬁcial behavior. If in such games (PDs or
TGs) conventions were possible so as to support a signiﬁcant level of cooperation,
it would be simple to suggest agreement on these rules of behaviors. But such
games simply have no conventions at all.
It is certainly true that also these games take the form required for the ex-
istence of conventions when they are inﬁnitely repeated so that folk-theorems
apply, and consequently numerous equilibria come to existence, some of them
inducing substantial cooperation. However, whereas convention theory says too
little about the solution of the original one-shot games, now it says too much
about these repeated models. Here there is no longer the typical failure of
individual rationality that would entail a suboptimal outcome of individual self-
interested non-cooperative interaction. On the contrary, there are numerous
equilibria that realize a considerable level of coordination to the mutual advan-
tage of players. All these equilibria can be interpreted as `spontaneous orders'
that may emerge from tacit adaptive interactions among non explicitly cooper-
ating players. In principle, a social contract is not necessary for the emergence
of such a spontaneous order. Evolution, trial and error, `liberation' or cumu-
lative learning processes (Bayesian or otherwise), or mere contextual cognitive
salience, may work as well, without entailing the ex ante exchange on the mu-
tual promises and obligations that are typical of an agreement (as Hume pointed
out).
However, a serious problem also concerns repeated PD or TG games where
many (or inﬁnite) conventions are in principle possible. The multiplicity prob-
lem amounts to complete uncertainty about which of the possible conventions
will emerge from the non-cooperative interaction among players considered as
individual agents making their choices given their personal preferences and ex-
pectations on other players' choices in a non-cooperative context. Until this
uncertainty is removed, neither can the compliance problem be solved. In fact,
only when a commonly known system of mutually consistent expectations is
achieved, one which converges on the prediction of a speciﬁc equilibrium as the
game solution, one can assume that each player has a uniquely determined best
response consisting in abiding by the strategy pertaining to the given equilibrium
convention. Until this common knowledge state is reached, there is no stability
and mutual consistency in the decisions whereby players try to achieve some
possible outcome of the game corresponding to the social contract. Assume that
some ex ante justiﬁcation has been established concerning the impartial accept-
ability of a particular outcome, but that ex post the multiplicity problem has still
not been solved. Thus each player remains uncertain about which equilibrium
combination will be de facto played by all the players. And there is no univocal
answer to the problem of compliance with the agreement in terms of recipro-
cal best responses. This can be seen as the main potential failure of individual
non-cooperative rational choice.
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Since the condition for a convention to exist is the formation of the required
system of mutually consistent expectations on actions and beliefs of whatever
level, the question is now how such a system can form in the minds of all the
interacting players, so that each of them will be able to predict that a given norm
is in fact the regularity of behavior currently being played in the resolution of
the given game. A natural suggestion is thus to consider the social contract as
one, if not the main, tool with which to solve the multiplicity problem; that
is, to consider the agreement as an equilibrium selection device. By solving
the ex ante decision problem (entry into the agreement) consistently with the
requirement of selecting just one equilibrium, the agreement may render the
ex post decision problem trivial. It can immediately induce compliance with
the selected-by-agreement equilibrium point that players predict as the game
solution.
In fact, some authors (Hampton 1986; Sacconi 1991; 1993a,b; Skyrms 1996;
Binmore 1989; 1994; 1998; 2005) have suggested a similar way to extend the
conventionalist perspective so as to transform it into an allied to social contract
theory. Indeed, they all reduce the social contract to an equilibrium selection
procedure. Thus the compliance problem is greatly simpliﬁed by assuming that
the agreement space is conﬁned to a subspace of the possible ex ante outcomes
i.e. is a subset coinciding with the set of the game equilibrium points (or some
subset properly deﬁned of the equilibrium set). Thus, when the agreement selects
an equilibrium, compliance naturally follows.
The simplest example of this line of reasoning is the Stag Hunt game as
the proper formal representation of social contract problem (Hampton 1986).
The social optimal is hunting a stag with coordinated players' eﬀorts, but lack
of trust among hunters will induce them to hunt one hare each with separate
eﬀorts, which is the risk-dominant strategy for each player (i.e. there is no risk
of failure in hunting hares individually). This equilibrium, reached though non-
coordinated actions, can be seen as the `state of nature' suboptimal outcome.
But now assume that reaching an agreement on hunting a stag is an eﬀective way
to create a complete state of trust among the players about the hypothesis that
if one tries to hunt the stag, the others will do the same. This agreement helps
reach the optimal outcome. Since it is an equilibrium supported by full trust,
equivalent to having a system of mutually consistent expectations converging on
the prediction that the stag will be hunted by all, it also assures full compliance.
However, the stag hunt is too simpliﬁed a situation to be considered a proper
representation of the multiplicity problem. Let us then consider Binmore's much
more elaborate joint solution of the social contract selection and compliance
problems (Binmore 2005). The underlying situation is the `game of life', namely
a repeated evolutionary PD-like game played by agents taking asymmetrically
powerful social roles (Adam and Eve). The set of all the evolutionary histories
of this repeated game deﬁnes a set of possible outcomes composed of all the
equilibria of the repeated game (according to some version of the folk theorem).
The outcome space itself is asymmetrical because it reﬂects asymmetry in the
strategic opportunities available to the players, each occupying the role of Adam
or Eve. Taking the set of possible repeated equilibria as given suggests consid-
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ering the matter from an ex ante perspective, as if it were possible to decide
once for all the evolutionary equilibrium path that the two players will follow
among the many possible. Thus the ex ante agreement works as an equilibrium
selection device.
What is remarkable in Binmore's view is that he models this equilibrium
selection procedure as an ex ante social contract in the proper sense: that is, as
a model of justiﬁable ex ante choice able to the agreement to be entered from
an impersonal and impartial standpoint or (in other words) from behind a `veil
of ignorance'. Impersonality is captured in the model by allowing the players to
exchange their roles (Adam and Eve) so that each player may take both the roles
and the relevant payoﬀs. The original equilibrium space is thus complemented
with another representation of the same equilibrium space resulting form its
symmetrical translation with respect to the Cartesian axes whereon each players'
utility function and payoﬀs are represented. Thus each outcome that in the ﬁrst
space gives to a player the payoﬀ associated with the advantaged role of Adam
is also represented in the translated outcome space by a symmetrical outcome
giving to the same player the payoﬀ associated with the disadvantaged role
of Eve, and vice versa. Impartiality is captured in the requirement that only
equally probable convex combinations of pairs of symmetrical outcomesthe
one belonging to the original equilibrium set and the other belonging to its
symmetrical translationmust be considered as candidate agreements. In other
words, an outcome can be considered a candidate for agreement only under the
condition of also considering the same outcome with the players' roles reversed as
a candidate for agreement with equal probability. Once an equilibrium outcome
has been selected for agreement, each of its payoﬀs can be assigned to both the
players with equal probability. Thus the agreement may only fall on the bisector
of the equilibrium spaces.
However, the convexity of the outcome space engendered by taking together
the original space and its symmetrical translation plus all the convex combina-
tions of any pair of outcomes belonging to the two spaces is not admitted. In
fact, this would amount to assuming that we have exited the state of nature
so that agreements can be reached on whatever probability combination of any
possible outcomes, because any outcome of an agreement can be enforced by an
external authority. But this is not the case. In the state of nature only equilib-
rium points can be agreed on, whereas many convex combinations of outcomes
belonging to the two symmetrical outcome spaces do not belong to the initial
equilibrium space. This amounts to restricting the set of possible agreements to
the symmetrical intersection of the original equilibrium set and its symmetrical
translation with respect to the utility axes. Any probability combination of two
points belonging to this symmetrical outcome space corresponds also to an equi-
librium point of the original outcome space. Furthermore, this correspondence
is assured for all the equally probable combinations of symmetrical outcomes,
because they lie on the bisector of the symmetrical subset resulting from the
intersection of the two outcome spaces. Having restricted the possible set of
agreements to the symmetrical intersection subset, and especially to its bisector,
it is natural to think that the social contract will coincide with the maximal Nash
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bargaining product within this symmetric outcome space. In other words, the
contractarian solution is the egalitarian Nash bargaining solution pertaining to
the symmetric intersection set, which is also the maximin solution with respect
to the original outcome space.
Summing up, under the conditions of a veil of ignorance (impersonality, im-
partiality and empathetic preferences) and self-sustainability through equilib-
rium choices (which entails no convexity of the feasible outcome space taken as
agreement domain) the solution is Rawlsian. Equilibrium selection is accom-
plished through two steps: the ﬁrst reﬁnes the equilibrium set by conﬁning it to
the symmetrical subset of the original space (i.e. the symmetrical intersection
set); then the Nash bargaining solution selects a unique optimal agreement on
the bisector of this symmetrical set which corresponds to the Rawlsian maximin.
However Binmore's results should not be overemphasized as far as the equi-
librium selection problem is concerned. What would eﬀectively solve the mul-
tiplicity problem is an equilibrium selection theory able to predict the ex post
game equilibrium solution so that it is consistent with the ex ante solution iden-
tiﬁed. In other words, selection is ex post eﬀective only if it gives reasons to act
that ﬁt the ex post reasoning context. Ex post, only common knowledge of the
solutionthat is, a system of mutually consistent expectations converging on the
prediction of a uniquely determined equilibrium pointconveys to each player
the appropriate reason to act, because choosing an equilibrium strategy amongst
many others requires having a clear prediction of other players' behaviors and
beliefs. However, there is no logical reason to conclude from the fact that in the
ex ante perspective a solution is invariant to the players' position replacement
that that solution will be eﬀectively implemented ex post. The reason that ex-
plains a particular decision in the ex post game is knowledge of what the players
will eﬀectively do. Moreover, this knowledge about the other players' decisions
must be consistent with their being symmetrically able to predict the others'
behavior and to choose their best response to those predictions. Therefore, it is
not the impartial selection of a desirable ex ante solution, but the knowledge of
other players' de facto behaviors, that provides the proper reason for acting in
the ex post context. Moreover, there is no logical implication from what is fair ex
ante selection (even if it falls on an equilibrium point) as to what other players
will actually do. Maybe they will act in accordance with the principle, maybe
they will not. The fair ex ante agreement, or impartial choice, does not give
common knowledge of the ex post behavior of players. If, however, one does not
know how other players will behave, one has no reason to play a given strategy,
even though the fair solution is part of an equilibrium point.
This is not to say that the ex ante agreement on an impartial solution does
not provide any reason to believe that players will act according to the same
principle in the ex post interaction. But this is simply a matter of fact, or of
cognitive psychology; it is not a matter of logic. Common knowledge, on the
contrary, is a matter of epistemic logic: which means recursive group knowledge
of what everybody knows to be true (a truism).1 It is the case that a given
1 The ex post rationality of the Nash equilibriumimplied by the notion of common
knowledgewas already clear in Lewis 1969, who also suggested that an agreement could
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equilibrium is commonly known to be played only if each player has many layers
of knowledge about every other player's action, beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, and
so on, that are consistent and justify the prediction that this equilibrium will
be played. This state of knowledge can be approximated by a theory of belief
formation that at last leads to a stable prediction of any other player's equilib-
rium choice and belief. Ex ante selection, by contrast, does not predict how one
will actually decide; it only answers the question of what equilibrium should be
chosen, because it is invariant under the individuals' position replacement. The
step from an answer to the question of which equilibrium is fair to an answer
to the question of how players will actually behave is a default inference that
some player may in fact make; but this is only a possibility. Thus, from the
perspective of the ex post game, there is still much to do before the multiplicity
problem is solved.
Let us add some exempliﬁcations of how the ex ante social contract could
not eﬀectively work as an ex post equilibrium selection device and consequently
also as a solution of the compliance problem. Assume that the game of life is
a repeated TG, so that the player in the role of Adam is the trustee, while the
player in the role of Eve is the trustor (who typically occupies a disadvantaged
role in this game). The equilibrium set of this game includes an entire out-
come region resulting from mixed strategies of the trustee, who combines the
abusing and not abusing strategies, and from the strategy `to enter' used by
the trustor. The latter acquiesces to the trustee's abuse because of the minimal
positive payoﬀ that these mixed strategy equilibria give to him. Amongst the
outcomes of these equilibria there is also the one that gives Stackelberg payoﬀs
to players. According to these payoﬀs, the trustor is reduced to complete indif-
ference between entering and staying out, while the trustee reaps practically all
the surplus. This is clearly the preferred equilibrium from the trustor's perspec-
tive. It can be simply shown that under a veil or ignorance the egalitarian Nash
bargaining solution selects the mutually advantageous outcome (Sacconi 2010b),
which is also the perfectly symmetrical equilibrium of the repeated game. But
consider the possibility that what has been agreed under the veil of ignorance is
not enough to convince one player that everybody else is going to play such an
egalitarian solution, and, moreover, that it is not suﬃcient to convince all play-
ers that others will expect such an equilibrium to be the game solution. Thus
the trustee is quite uncertain about the equilibrium that will be selected by the
trustor in response to his entrance. He may guess that, since the trustee prefers
the Stackelberg payoﬀ so intensely, he will put as much eﬀort as possible into
selection of the corresponding equilibrium. Since this reasoning can be repli-
cated in the trustor's mind, there is at least a reasonable line of thought that
seems to induce the players to conclude that the more probable equilibrium that
give an empirical explanation of how a state of common knowledge could emerge. However,
Lewis focused on the diﬀerent cognitive phenomenon of salience. On the game theoretic deﬁ-
nition of common knowledge, see Binmore/Brandenburger 1990; Kreps 1990; on the epistemic
logic of common knowledge, see Fagin/Halpern/Moses/Vardi 1996. On the selection of Nash
equilibria based on common knowledge of the unique solution see Harsanyi/Selten 1988.
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the trustee will select after the trustor's entrance is the one giving Stackelberg
payoﬀs (Sacconi 2011; Andreozzi 2010).
Similarly, take the Stag Hunt as the game to be considered under the hy-
pothesis that an ex ante agreement is not able to engender complete certainty
about the fact that both the players will play the optimal equilibrium consist-
ing in hunting the stag. But only a little uncertainty may in this case have a
dramatic consequence. If a player is uncertain about the prediction concerning
the optimal solution, then the risk dominant argument regains its force, and it
is able ex post to induce players to shift to the hare-hunting equilibrium. Ob-
viously, this would destroy the entire result from the ex post perspective. Thus
this section suggests that Nash equilibria are not suﬃcient in order to give a
convincing solution to the social-contract-compliance problem.
1.3 Ways Out of the Compliance Problem: Psychological
Dispositions
In the long-standing debate on the relationship between rationality and morality,
some authors have sought to revise the notion of instrumental rationality to
include rational choice of dispositions (Gauthier 1986; 1990; 1994; McClennen
1990a,b; 1993). A disposition would constrain later choices, so that the agent
can disregard local incentives even if these imply that there are local advantages
to deviating from the action plan corresponding to the disposition.
These attempts to overcome the compliance problem seem not to have been
successful. On the one hand, the revision of the instrumental rationality required
for a theory of disposition choice seems to presuppose what it should demon-
strate. The choice of a disposition seems to be very similar to the decision to
undertake a conditional binding commitment, which is obviously problematic
in that the compliance problem is assumed to have a PD-like structure that
prevents assuming that such binding commitments are possible. If binding com-
mitments are allowed, of course, the proposed line of argument is not a reform of
instrumental rationality at allit only amounts to a perhaps reasonable change
of the game considered. It seems to reduce morality to instrumental rationality
by showing that abiding by a norm of conditional cooperation is rational. But in
doing so, it must presume that dispositions are `out there' and endowed with all
their disciplining force independently of rational choice. And whilst dispositions
are taken to be choices at our disposalwe can decide whether or not to develop
themthey are also presumed to command our later behaviours, being immune
to opportunistic changes when these seem proﬁtable, as if these choices were
beyond our control.
On the other hand, the situation becomes quite problematic if we try to ex-
plain how developing a conditional disposition to abide by a norm of cooperation
may be reduced to a question of instrumental rationality and practical deliber-
ation. This amounts to demonstrating that it is `rational' to decide to be that
kind of person who acts according to a conditional disposition to comply with
the norm, even before the disposition is capable of constraining our behaviour
and even if we could also devise dispositions able to cheat other players simi-
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larly involved in cultivating conditionally cooperative dispositions. An example
is a deceitful disposition that continues to dispose the player, who undertakes it,
to conditionally cooperate until another player interacting with him `reads' the
disposition itself, but then changes the disposition in order to allow the player ex-
ploiting the second player's disposition to cooperate (Danielson 1992). In short,
this line of reasoning seems bound to produce many sorts of contradictions (see
Binmore 1994)
What seems mistaken in this approach, however, is not the idea of analyzing
moral dispositions but the idea that undertaking moral dispositions may be a
matter of practical reasoning and sophisticated instrumental decision calculus,
whereas it could be a matter of developing a moral sentiment (the `desire' to be
just) endowed with some motivational force on its own, and capable of generating
additional motivational drives to act that can be introduced into the players'
preference systemsunder proper conditions to be deﬁned. If this simple idea is
accepted, the desire to comply could be an input to the compliance decision, not
the output from a reform of the decision theoretic machine, and we would only
need to understand how this desire may be engendered and how it is connected
to the social contract. This could enable us to discover otherquite diﬀerent
causal connections between the decision to comply and the rationality of an ex
ante agreement.
A similar approach to the compliance problem was suggested by John Rawls
in the Theory of Justice (1971), where he proposed the `sense of justice' as a solu-
tion for the stability problem of a well-ordered societyi.e. a society whose insti-
tutions are arranged according to principles of justice (norms in our sense) chosen
under a `veil of ignorance'. This solution, however, was for long overlooked by
economists and game theorists because it was at odds with the methodology of
rational choice in that it resorted to socio-psychological assumptions common in
theories of moral learning.2
2 Rather ironically, we have seen that Rawls's theory of the social contract has been vin-
dicated by its important translation in game theoretical terms, with the proof that, given a
set of non-cooperative equilibria resulting from the natural evolution of society, the only selec-
tion compatible with both the feasibility condition of equilibria and the `the veil of ignorance'
(invariance under the personal position symmetric replacement) is Rawlsian maximin or the
egalitarian solution (Binmore 2005). This means that if one wants to implement a choice un-
der the veil of ignorance through an equilibrium point that guarantees incentive compatibility,
then one must focus on equality or the maximin solution. This is ironic, because if Rawlsian
principles for institutions were stable in the Nash equilibrium sensethat is, if they provided
the only equilibrium selection mechanism under the veil of ignorance, whereas other princi-
ples, like utilitarianism, would be unfeasible and not implementablethey would be complied
with only for self-interested reasons and would dispense with the emergence of the sense of
justice. But this argument only proves that Rawls's proposal is superior to any other social
contract solution under the veil of ignorance if what is required is making a selection within
the set of equilibria emerging because of natural evolution of the game of life. Rawls's general
argument, however, could be understood as not imposing ex ante the constraint that a fair
agreement should be conﬁned within the naturally evolved set of equilibrium points since some
fairer outcome should result that is beyond the reach of the ex ante agreement. McClennen
(1990a) took this part of Rawls's theory as the basis for his own approach to the stability of the
constitutional contract. Similarly to Rawls and Gauthier, McClennen thinks that compliance
is a disposition to cooperate conditionally on other players' cooperation. However, he ﬁnds
Rawls's solution weak in so far as it postulates the sense of justice as an attitude which is
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However, given the behavioral turn in microeconomics, it is time to reconsider
this neglected solution and to acknowledge that it may suggest an illuminating
explanation of why some of us comply with just institutions even if we have some
direct material incentive not to do so.
1.4 Plan of the Paper
The next section summarizes Rawls' argument about how a sense of justice is
engendered by the awareness that principles of justice followed in a `well or-
dered society' have been agreed on under a veil of ignorance and how this at-
titude oﬀers endogenous support to the well-ordered society's stability. It then
suggests that the relevant features of Rawls's theory captured in the behav-
ioral model of contractarian conformist preference that we will follow in this
paper (Grimalda/Sacconi 2005; Sacconi/Grimalda 2007; Faillo/Sacconi 2007;
Sacconi/Faillo 2010). This model is set out in section 3. It explains how a
disposition to conform with agreed principles of justice, conditional on beliefs
concerning other agents' choices and their expected reciprocity, may enter the
preference system of a player by assigning psychological payoﬀsadditional to
material payoﬀsto choices that approximate an ideal of justice given the other
players' choices and their level of conformity. Since psychological payoﬀs are a
function of the players' reciprocal beliefs of ﬁrst and second order about their
levels of conformity, the model is based on psychological game theory (Genako-
plos et al. 1989; Rabin 1993). But it introduces the completely new idea that
conformity preferences depend on an ex ante impartial agreement on a princi-
ple. Then in section 4 the contractarian conformist theory is applied to a special
game, the exclusion game, explicitly devised for the purpose of representing a
engendered by the creation of the well-ordered society's institutions, chosen under a veil of
ignorance, but it is not a matter of rational choice over dispositions as such. According to
McClennen, Rawls's approach is exogenous with respect to the mechanism of rational choice,
and he seeks to endogenize the sense of justice through his theory of resolute choice extended
to the context of non-cooperative games (McClennen 1993). Resolute choice in these contexts
means that a player undertakes by a decision a disposition that commits himself to forgoing,
at some later decision node in the game tree, opportunities for defection which are locally
advantageous (so that locally defecting can be dominant). The reason for doing so is a re-
quirement of consistency with an initial plan, whichwhen followed by allpermits players to
achieve collectively higher payoﬀs and to fare better. Of course this idea cannot work if players
have the eﬀective option of defecting at a later decision node where they ﬁnd that it is locally
rational to do so because of local incentives (for example in a last stage having the Prisoners'
Dilemma structure without reputation eﬀects) Hence McClennen suggests reform of the the-
ory of rational decisions in games, admitting that in order to allow this kind of choice among
eﬀective dispositions able eﬀectively to commit players, we should relinquish hypotheses such
as the game tree's separability into its sub-games, and consequently renounce the possibility
of truncating sub-trees and substituting them with their local solutions (when available). He
concludes by discarding backward induction (also when it could provide uniquely determined
solutions). Our opinion is that this reform of rationality criteria is too costly to game theory,
whereas Rawls's perspective is endogenous enough for the endeavor to explain the emergence
of a sense of justice as a set of attitudes governed by a disposition having motivational force on
its own (the force of a desire) because it is grounded on the ex ante decision under a veil of ig-
norance and it inﬂuences the cognitive mechanisms of expectations formation and motivations
formation, leading to a preference capable of commanding a decision behavior.
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social situation wherein only adhesion to impartial distributive justice princi-
ples may allow escape from an egoistic equilibrium of the devision problem on a
given surplus such that some players are completely discriminated against in the
distribution. This section shows how an agreement under the veil of ignorance
not only selects an impartial principle about the sharing of a surplus, but may
also activate contractarian conformist preferences. These transform the payoﬀ
structure of the game by engendering psychological equilibria that represent the
sense of justice eﬀectuality in inducing endogenous compliance with principles
of justice selected under the veil of ignorance.
Let us recall that the theory is not conﬁned to the kind of games wherein the
mutual advantage of decision-makers cannot support a fair social contract. Else-
where (Sacconi 2011) it has been proved that, in the repeated TG, conformist
preferences are eﬀective in reﬁning the equilibrium set up to only two psycholog-
ical equilibria. However, the game that we discuss in this paper seems more akin
to the Rawlsian perspective, in so far as in this game no Nash equilibria may
support a fair social contract that allows inclusion of all the players in the sharing
of a social surplus. On the contrary, psychological equilibria based on conformist
preferenceswith which we formally represent the `sense of justice'provide an
endogenous explanation of social contract compliance.
The remaining sections of the paper are devoted to reporting experimen-
tal support for the conformist contractarian theory. The experiments considered
(see also Sacconi/Faillo 2010; Faillo/Ottone/Sacconi 2008) are naturally situated
in the ever-growing literature on experimental games aimed at investigating non-
selﬁsh economic behavior, social preferences, reciprocity, and the importance of
social norms in understanding players' preferences and behaviors (for example:
Rabin 1993; Fehr/Schmidt 1999; Falk/Fischbacher 2006; Levine 1998). Com-
pared with existing experimental studies on social preferences and reciprocity,
the experiments reported here consider the relevance of an aspect that no other
study has to date considered: the importance of an impartial agreement under
the veil of ignorance in inducing a strong change in the players' behavior with
respect to conformity with principles of justice that have been agreed, although
without assuming binding commitments, and not presupposing either externally
enforcing mechanisms or the possibility of reputation eﬀects.
The ﬁrst experiment reported was based on an intra-group design that exper-
imentally replicated the exclusion game logic. A group of experimental subjects
anonymously participated ﬁrst in an experimental version of the exclusion game
with assigned roles. They were then allowed to participate in a voting procedure
under a veil of ignorance (i.e. ignoring their role in the game). The aim was to
reach unanimous agreement on principles of division.
Last, if the subjects had been able to agree, they could play the exclusion
game again with roles reassigned. The second experiment was based on an
intergroup design where distinct groups of subjects were confronted (i) with the
exclusion game as such (with no opportunity for ex ante agreement), and (ii)
with a treatment where they were allowed to participate in a pre-play stage
of impartial agreement on division principles under a veil of ignorance about
their roles (voting procedure), beforeadmitted that they had agreed on some
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principlethey had the opportunity to play the exclusion game with assigned
roles. A third treatment was introduced into this experimental design in order
to compare levels of conformity with principles in two cases: (a) when principles
had been agreed under a veil of ignorance by a group of anonymous players who
were then asked to play the exclusion game after the role assignation; (b) when
after the agreement the composition of groups was partially changed so that
each group of strong players was matched with an outsider who as far as they
knew might had agreed on a diﬀerent principle. What this experimental design
sought to investigate was whether it is the impartial agreement on principles, plus
expectations about reciprocal conformity by others, or the simple expectations
of others about our behavior even if we have not accepted the principle on our
own, that is the main source of conformist preferences and norm compliance. An
essential aspect of studying this matter is elicitation of ﬁrst- and second-order
beliefs about others' choices, as well as elicitation of normative judgments and
second-order normative expectations (what one thinks that others normatively
expect from one).
2. The `Sense of Justice'
Justice as fairness, Rawls says, understood as the set of principles of justice
chosen `under a veil of ignorance'once the principles are assumed to shape the
institutions of a well-ordered societyprovides its own support to the stability
of just institutions. In fact when institutions are just (here it should be clear
that we are taking the ex post perspective, i.e. once the constitutional decision
from the ex ante position has already been taken and for some reason has been
successful), those who take part in the arrangement develop a sense of justice that
carries with it the desire to support and maintain that arrangement. The idea is
that motives to act are now enriched with a new motivation able to overcome the
counteracting tendency to injustice. Note that instability is viewed in terms of
a PD-like situation: institutions may be unstable because complying with them
may not be the best response of each participant to other members' behavior.
However, the sense of justice, once developed, overcomes incentives to cheat
and transforms fair behavior into each participant's best response to the other
individuals' behaviors.
To understand how this is possible, it is necessary to consider the deﬁnition
of `sense of justice'. Although the latter presupposes the development of lower-
level moral sentiments of love and trust, understood as feelings of attachment
to lower-level institutions (families and just associations) perceived to be just,
the sense of justice is a desire to act upon general and abstract principles of
justice as such, once they have been chosen under a veil of ignorance as the
shaping principles of institutions, and hence have proved beneﬁcial to ourselves
in practice. Note that it is not the case that we act upon the principles insofar
as they are beneﬁcial only to the concrete persons with whom we have direct
links and emotional involvements. Once the level of a morality of principles has
been reached, our desire to act upon the principles does not depend on other
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people's approbation or on other contingent factors such as satisfaction of the
interests of some particular concrete person. On the contrary, it is the system
of principles of justice in itself that constitutes the object of the sense of justice.
The question to be answered thus becomes how it is possible that princi-
ples themselves are capable of inﬂuencing our aﬀectionsthat is, of generating
the sense of justice as a relatively self-contained `desire to conform with the
principles'. The answer is twofold.
First, the sense of justice is not independent of the content of principles.
These are principles that we could have decided to agree upon under a veil
of ignorance as expressions of our rationality as free and equal moral persons.
These principles are mutually advantageous and hence impartially acceptable
by a rational choice, even if it is made from an impartial perspective, for they
promote our interests and hence have some relation with our aﬀections (pref-
erences). Thus, in order for a sense of justice to develop, principles cannot be
arbitrary. They must be those principles that would have been chosen by a
rational impartial agreement.
Second, despite the intellectual eﬀect of recognizing that principles are ratio-
nally acceptable, the basic fact about the sense of justice is that it is by nature
a moral sentiment inherently connected to natural attitudes. Moral sentiments
are systems of dispositions interlocked with the human capability to realize nat-
ural attitudes. Thus moral liability for lacking moral sentiments has a direct
counterpart in the lack of certain natural attitudes which results in aﬀective
responses like a sense of guilt, indignation or shame. Hence, even though the
thought experiment of a decision under the veil of ignorance merely aids us in
the intellectual recognition of the acceptability of principles, the sense of justice
retains a motivational force on its own, which can be only traced back to its
nature as a moral sentiment or desire not entirely reducible to the experience of
its intellectual justiﬁcation.
The proper functioning of the sense of justice can be understood, however, as
the third level of a process of moral learning which in its ﬁrst two steps already
cultivates moral sentiments of love for parents and trust and friendship vis-à-vis
the members of just associations in which the individual already takes partand
which s/he re-elaborates on those pre-existing sentiments.
Given that a person's capacity for fellow feeling has been realized
by forming attachment in accordance with the ﬁrst two [. . . ] [lev-
els] and given that a society's institutions are just and are publicly
known to be just, then this person acquires the correspondent sense
of justice as he recognized that he and those for whom he cares are
the beneﬁciaries of these arrangements. (Rawls 1971, 491)
As seems clear, reciprocity is a basic element in this deﬁnition. In fact, reci-
procity is understood as a deep-lying psychological fact of human nature amount-
ing to the tendency to answer in kind. The sense of justice
arises from the manifest intention of other persons to act for our
good. Because they recognize they wish us well we care for their
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well being in return. Thus we acquire attachment to persons and
institutions according to how we perceive our good to be aﬀected by
them. The basic idea is one of reciprocity, a tendency to answer in
kind. (494)
Two aspects are to be noted concerning the other person's `manifest intention'
which elicits the tendency to `answer in kind'. We recognize an unconditional
caring for our good deriving from other people acting consistently with the prin-
ciples of justice. Hence reciprocity is elicited not from the mere coherence of
institutions with the principles of justice, but from the fact that other people
make our good by acting intentionally upon those principles. What matters is
not just reciprocity in accepting the principles, but the intention displayed by
other players concretely acting upon the principles for our well-being. Secondly,
this intention cannot be a direct intention toward us as particular persons. By
complying with principles, our good is pursued in an unconditional waythat
is, impartially and not conditionally on any particular description of us based
on contingent characteristics or positions.
Summing up, we may reconstruct the hypotheses that according to Rawls
must be satisﬁed in order for a sense of justice to evolve:
a) lower level moral sentiments must have fostered our capacity for a sense of
justice; they are exogenous factors pertaining to the psychological make-up
of the person and aﬀecting his/her emotional capacity;
b) we recognize that ongoing institutions (norms) are just because we are
able to justify then in terms of their acceptability under a veil of ignorance
agreement;
c) it is public knowledge that institutions are just, which seems to mean not
only that we know that they are justiﬁed, and we know that also other
individuals know that they are justiﬁed, but also that we publicly know
that they eﬀectively operate for the most of the time in accordance with
the principle of justice;
d) from the facts that we publicly know that institution are just, and that
others know that they are just and work according to the principles of
justice, it follows that other individuals conform with the principles and
hence are our beneﬁciaries in an unconditional way, and we know that they
are;
e) under the foregoing conditions, everybody is driven by a deep psychological
tendency to answer in kind, which means replicating conformity with the
principles, given that conformity with principles by others expresses an
intention to be beneﬁcial to us in an unconditional and impartial manner.
When these premises are satisﬁed, the sense of justice develops, and becomes
an integral part of our conception of the good. That is to say, it becomes an
integral part of what we see as our good, part of the ﬁnal ends that we pursue
with our intentional behavior.
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Clearly, some points left inexplicit in Rawls's text have been completed by
interpretation in our reconstruction. It also makes immediately evident that the
sense of justice is a force that typically emerges and stabilizes a well-ordered
society only ex post, when institutions are already `out there' operating through
some level of compliance by the members of society. Thus the question arises
of from where compliance with principles stems at the very ﬁrst step of their
implementation, when it cannot be said that there is an history of well-ordered
society institutions already operating.
Nevertheless, important here are the following elements taken from Rawls's
analysis and incorporated into the model of conformist preference explained in
the next section.
i) First, there is an exogenous disposition in our motivational system of drives
to actionthe capacity of a desire to act upon principles or the agent's du-
ties. This derives from learning about the justice of lower-level institutions
(family, associations) or the widespread operating of the institutions of a
well-ordered society (such that if these conditions are not fully satisﬁed,
this exogenous motivational factor cannot be assumed to have an over-
whelming force in general, and thus must balance with other motivational
drives).
ii) Second, the foregoing element deﬁnes as just a capacity for the sense of
justice, but its proper formation depends upon conditions relative only to
the principles of justice and their compliance, as follows
a. agents construe and justify norms as the result of an impartial agree-
ment under the `veil of ignorance': that is, before considering confor-
mity, the principles of diﬀerent states of aﬀairs resulting from com-
pliant or non-compliant actions must be assessed in term of their
consistency with the fair principlescompliance is not arbitrary;
b. each agent knows that also others justify the norm and assess com-
pliance decisions in a similar way;
c. we know, or have the reasoned belief that other agents are eﬀectively
playing their part in carrying out the principles, and this behavior,
because of the content of the principles with which it conforms, ex-
presses an intention to be beneﬁcial to us in impartial terms. Thus
by playing our part in compliance we may be understood as recipro-
cating other agents' intentionsi.e. our compliance is conditional on
theirs;
d. owing to the hypothesis of public knowledge, also other agents are
predicted as having (and we know that they have) the reasoned belief
that we do our part in beneﬁting them in an impartial manner by
acting upon the principles; and thus they may be seen as reciprocating
our intention expressed by our compliance with the principleshence
our compliance is conditional on their reciprocity as well.
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e. When these conditions are satisﬁed, our capacity to form a `sense
of justice' becomes eﬀective and translates into a motivational force
able to counteract incentives to act unjustly in situations like the
PD gamei.e. a psychological preference for complying overcomes
the preference for personal advantages gained by not complying and
opportunistically exploiting other agents' cooperation.
An alternative interpretation could assume that simply because all individuals
know that institutions are just in terms of the principles, any particular indi-
vidual develops the desire to comply with them. But in this case it would be
entirely unclear how an individual is able to understand that other agents' be-
haviors are expressing the intention to beneﬁt him/her by following the principle
of justice, which seems a necessary condition for saying that by complying with
the principle s/he `responds in kind'. If his/her response in kind does not simply
amount to intellectual acceptance of the principles but also consists in complying
with them, it is necessary that other agents do not simply accept or recognize
intellectually that institutions are just; they must also be seen as acting upon
the principles in practice. Only in this case can compliance be a response in
kind: compliance in return for compliance. Thus the sense of justice not only
depends on the direct assessment of any decision in terms of its coherence with
principles but is also conditional on beliefs concerning the eﬀective compliance
by other agents given what they themselves believe. Even if this seems to be
the correct understanding of Rawls, we call it a weak version (conditional and
reciprocity based) of Rawls's sense of justice.
3. Conformist Preferences
The theory of conformist preference (Grimalda/Sacconi 2002; 2005; Sacconi/
Grimalda 2007) initially devised in order to explain nonproﬁt behaviors and
organizations, proves entirely consistent with (but more precisely testable than)
the general idea of norm compliance derived from Rawls.3
Assume that two or more players are involved in a typical non-cooperative
game where Nash equilibria are suboptimal, or a non-cooperative division game
exists such that the Nash equilibrium is so deﬁned that at least some players
are completely excluded from any sharing of the surplus, and hence equilibria
are not mutually beneﬁcial (think of such a game as a Dictator Game with two
interacting dictators and one passive receiver). Of course, such games do not
have mutually beneﬁcial equilibrium solutions including all the players in some
sharing of the pie at stake (more on this game in section 4 ). Before such a game
3 We do not say that the theory is entirely Rawlsian, since it assumes that in the ex
ante decision a social contract is subscribed on the Nash bargaining solution of the relevant
game, whereas Rawls would have suggested the maximin solution. What we simply say is
that the solution given to the norm compliance problem through conformist preferences is
strictly consistent with Rawls' idea of the sense of justice. However, consider that the Nash
bargaining solution in a symmetric bargaining situation implies the egalitarian solution which
is also consistent with Rawls' maximin (see the introduction to this paper and Binmore 2005).
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is played, it is assumed that a pre-play communication stage occurs wherein,
by an impartial (`behind the veil of ignorance') decision, players may agree on
a principle of distributive justice (a norm) assigning a solution to the ensuing
game (even though this solution will not necessarily coincide with an equilibrium
point, i.e. it may not be incentive incompatible). In classical game theory terms,
this pre-play communication phase is simply `cheap talk' in that agreements
reached in this phase are not binding commitments and hence do not constrain
or restrict the strategy space of the ensuing game in any way. Since pre-play
agreement is just cheap talk, it should not prevent players from choosing in the
game's prosecution the strategy that, given their prediction of other players'
strategies, maximizes their own material payoﬀ independently of the content of
the agreed norm.
Nevertheless, at this stage, players put themselves in the hypothetical situ-
ation of an ex ante potential agreement. They perform the collective thought
experiment of playing a bargaining game under a `veil of ignorance', each of
them concealing from the others his/her identity and role as a player in the en-
suing actual game. By this stage they can agree on a principle of justice able to
determine a solution for the ensuing game from a normative point of view. The
theory of conformist preference explains why this pre-play communication stage
can result in eﬀective decisions to comply with the agreed principle through an
endogenous engendering of a preference favorable to compliance with the agreed
principle that may counterbalance the material incentives represented in the
initial description of the game.
The idea is that economic agents are motivated both by consequentialist
(and mainly self-interested) and `conformist' preferencesthat is, the intrinsic
motivation to act according to an agreed principle if complied with reciprocally
by other interacting agents as well. Thus, the utility maximization model of a
rational economic man can be considerably revised, extending its explanatory
and normative power at a substantive level by representing these diﬀerent kinds
of preferences in the corresponding part of a comprehensive utility function.
The model assumes what we call a state description-relative viewpoint of pref-
erences. The same states of aﬀairs generated by the players' strategic decisions
can be described in diﬀerent ways according to their relevant characteristics. A
ﬁrst description of states views them as consequences: what happens to any par-
ticular participant, or only to the decision-maker, because of a given course of
action. In general, if a player deﬁnes his/her preferences only on states described
as consequences, then s/he has consequentialist personal preferences. These pref-
erences are accounted for by the typical utility function of a player, Ui which for
convenience will be called the material component of the utility function.
But secondly, states can be described as sets of interdependent actions and
then characterized in terms of whether or not they are consistent with a given
abstract principle of distributive justice seen as resulting from a (possibly hy-
pothetical) ex-ante agreement between the players involved in the interaction.
The utility function component representing these preferences will be called the
`conformist utility' of a player and it must be deﬁned so as to give a consistent
representation of the deontological motive to act that underlies this preference.
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According to the conformist preference theory, this motivation is not absolute
but contingent on expectations about the other agent's action and level of reci-
procity in conformity given his/her expectation on the ﬁrst player's action. In
other words, a player's disposition to conform depends on how far s/he can ap-
proximate the ideal level of principle satisfaction given his/her expectation about
the other agent's action, and on how much s/he believes the other player can
contribute to the approximation of the ideal level of principle satisfaction given
his/her beliefs in the ﬁrst player.
In other words, intuitively speaking, a player will gain intrinsic utility from
the simple fact of acting in accordance with a principle, if s/he expects that in
this way s/he will be able to contribute to fulﬁlling the distributive principle,
admitted that s/he expects the other players also to contribute to fulﬁlling the
same principle, given their expectations.
A complete measure of conformist preferences consists in the combination of
the following four elements through the conformist-psychological component of
a player utility function (see Grimalda/Sacconi 2005):
First, a principle T, which is a social welfare function that establishes a dis-
tributive criterion of material utilities. Players adopt T (the norm) by agreement
in a pre-play phase, and employ it in the generation of a consistency ordering
over the set of possible states σ, each seen as a combination of individual strate-
gies. The highest value of T is reached in situations σ where material utilities
are distributed in such a way that they are most consistent with the distributive
principle T among the alternatives available. Note that what matters to T is not
`who gets how much' material payoﬀ (the principle T is neutral with respect to in-
dividual positions), but how utilities are distributed across players. Satisfaction
of the distributional property is the basis for conformist preferences. We assume
that T coincides with the Nash bargaining product (NBP)i.e.
∑
i(si − di)
where si and di are player i's payoﬀ and reservation utility respectively.
4
Second, a measure of the extent to which, given the other agents' expected
actions, the ﬁrst player by her/his strategy choice contributes to a fair distri-
bution of material payoﬀs in terms of the principle T. This may also be put in
terms of the extent to which the ﬁrst player is responsible for a fair distribution,
given what (s/he expects that) the other player will do. To put it diﬀerently, it
is a measure f1 of the extent to which, given player 2's expected actions, the ﬁrst
player contributes with his/her choice to the realization of the state of aﬀairs
in which the social welfare function T is maximized. It reduces to a conformity
index assuming values between −1 (no conformity at allor maximum distance
from the maximum value of T) and 0 (full conformityor minimum distance
from the maximum value of T).
Third, a measure of the extent to which the other player is expected to
contribute to a fair distribution in terms of the principle T, given what s/he
(is expected to) expects from the ﬁrst player's behaviour. This may also be
4 The Nash Bargaining Solution may be understood as a formal model for the `social con-
tract' that players would agree in an ex ante (possibly hypothetical) collective decision on the
rules that should constrain (at least as a matter of `ought') the allocation of surpluses arising
form their interactions (see Sacconi 2000; Binmore 1998; 2005).
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put in terms of the (expected) responsibility of the other player for generating
a fair allocation of the surplus, given what s/he (is believed to) believes. Put
otherwise, it is a measure f˜2 of the extent to which the other player is expected
to contribute to the realization of the state in which T is maximized, given what
s/he is believed to expect about the ﬁrst player's action. Again, this reduces to
a reciprocal conformity index assuming values between −1 (no conformity at all,
as in the case in which the expected action chosen by the other player minimizes
the value of T, given his/her expectations about the ﬁrst player's choice) and 0
(full conformity, as in the case in which the expected action chosen by the player
maximizes the value of T, given his/her expectations about the ﬁrst players'
choice).
Fourth, an exogenous parameter λ representing the motivational force of the
agent's psychological disposition to act on the motive of reciprocal conformity
with an agreed norm.5
Steps two and three combine to deﬁne an overall index F of conditional and
expected reciprocal conformity for each player in each state of the game. This
index operates as a weight (between 0 and 1) on the exogenous parameter λ
determining whether or not λ will actually aﬀect (and, if so, to what extent)
the player's payoﬀs. To sum up the eﬀect of the diﬀerent components, if a
player expects that the other player will be responsible for the maximal value
of T, given what the other player expects about his/her behaviour, and s/he is
also responsible for a maximal value of T, given the other player's (expected)
behaviour, then the motivational weight of conformity λ will fully enter his/her
utility function. That is, the player's preference system will show all the force
of the disposition to conform with agreed norms, so that complying with the
principle will yield utility (in the psychological sense) additional to the material
payoﬀ of the same strategy.
As a consequence, the overall utility function of player i with reference to the
state σ (understood as a strategy combination of player i's strategy σi and the
other players' strategies σ−i), is the following
Vi (σ) = Ui (σ) + λiF [T (σ)]
where
i. U i is player i's material utility for the state σ;
ii. λi is an exogenous parameter that may be any positive number and ex-
presses the motivational force of the disposition to comply with an agreed
principle or norm;
iii. T is a fairness principle (assumed to be a social welfare function with the
speciﬁc form of NBS), whose value is deﬁned here for the state σ;
iv. F = (1+ f1)(1+ f˜2) is a compound index expressing both agent i's condi-
tional conformity and the other individuals' expected reciprocal conformity
5 This assumption corresponds to Rawls's assumption of a capacity to form a sense of justice
derivable from the lower-level moral sentiments.
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with principle T in state σ, given player i's beliefs of ﬁrst and second or-
der (i.e. beliefs about the other players' ﬁrst-order beliefs) predicting that
state σ is in fact the case.
When agent 1 does not comply with the norm and s/he does not expect con-
formity by agent 2i.e. the indexes of conditional (f1) and reciprocal (f˜2) are
equal to −1F is equal to zero. F is equal to 1 in the case of full conformity by
agent 1 and expected full conformity by agent 2i.e. when both the indexes of
conditional (f1) and reciprocal (f˜2) conformity are equal to 0. λi is zero when
agent i does not have any desire to conform with a shared norm of distributive
justice. When either λi or F is equal to zero, the conformist/deontological com-
ponent of the utility function is not active and the player will choose the strategy
that maximizes only his/her monetary payoﬀ.
To sum up, if a player expects that the other player will contribute to the
maximization of T, given what the other player expects about his/her choice,
and s/he also contributes to the maximization of T, given the other player's
expected choice, than the disposition index λ will fully enter his/her utility
function, because F is equal to 1. That is, the motivational force to conform
with the norm will be maximum, and complying with the norm will yield addi-
tional psychological utility that sums with the material utility deriving from the
consequentialist/material component of the utility function.
4. A Game of Reference: The Exclusion Game
The relevance and implications of conformist preference in strategic interactions
have been empirically tested by Sacconi/Faillo (2010) and by Faillo/Ottone/
Sacconi (2008) in two experimental studies based on the so-called Exclusion
Game. The game reproduces a situation in which the interaction among a
set of individuals makes a social surplus aﬀordable. But only some of these
individualsthe strong playersare in charge of taking decisions concerning
the allocation of the surplus. The other individualsthe weak playershave
no voice and their income depends completely on the strong players' decision.
Strong players then have the power to decide whether to include the weak ones
in the sharing of the surplus or whether to appropriate the whole of it.
The exclusion game poses the problem of distributive justice possibility in
its purest way. It explores whether it may happen that active players include a
weak player in the sharing of a given surplus such that nobody can claim to have
contributed more to its production than anyone else, but nonetheless there is no
mutual advantage for the active players in taking the inclusive decision, given
that they are not afraid of losing their reputation, and the weak player does not
have the threat power that may coerce them to include him/her.
In the basic three-player version of the Exclusion Game two strong players
(Strong1 and Strong2) must decide how to allocate a sum of money (S) between
themselves and a weak player (Weak) who has no decisional power and whose
payoﬀ depends on strong players' choices. In particular, Strong1 and Strong2
have to declaresimultaneously and independently of each otherhow much of
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Ask for 3 3,3,6 3,4,5 3,6,3 
Ask for 4 4,3,5 4,4,4 4,6,2 
Ask for 6 6,3,3 6,4,2 6,6,0 
 
Figure 1: A three-player Exclusion Game. Payoﬀ matrix
the sum S they want for themselves choosing among three options1/4 of S, 1/3
of S or 1/2 of S. The ﬁnal payoﬀ of each strong player corresponds to the amount
asked for her/himself, the remaining sum is assigned to Weak. Figure 1 reports
the payoﬀ matrix of the game when S=12; in each cell the ﬁrst two numbers are
Strong1's and Strong2's payoﬀ respectively, the third number is Weak's payoﬀ.
Given the choice options of the strong players, if both Strong1 and Strong2
choose to ask for half of the surplus (cell Ask for 6, Ask for 6 of the payoﬀ
matrix), their payoﬀ is 6 while Weak's payoﬀ is 0. This is the case in which
the weak player is completely excluded from the sharing of S. Inclusion of Weak
implies that at least one of the strong players asks for less than a half of the
surplus. An equal split is obtained when both Strong1 and Strong2 decide to
ask only for 1/3 of S (cell Ask for 4, Ask for 4 in ﬁgure 1).
If we assume that strong players are motivated only by the desire to maximize
their material payoﬀ, the only Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies of this
game is the one in which both Strong1 and Strong2 ask for half of the surplus,
leaving nothing to Weak.
4.1 The Exclusion Game Played by Agent with Conformist
Preferences
Let us now consider how they Exclusion Game of ﬁgure 1 would be played by
agents endowed with conformist preferences and who have reached a pre-play
agreement on a norm of distributive justice corresponding to the maximization
of Nash bargaining product.
In order to ﬁnd the equilibria of the game, the ﬁrst step consists in ranking
the possible outcomes of the game (states of aﬀairs) on the basis of corresponding
values of the social welfare function T.
In the case of the game of ﬁgure 1, assuming that players have a reservation
utility of zero, the ranking is the following:
T (4, 4, 4) = 64 > T (3, 4, 5) = T (4, 3, 5) = 60 > T (3, 6, 3) = T (6, 3, 3)
= T (3, 3, 6) = 54 > T (6, 4, 2) = T (4, 6, 2) = 48 > T (6, 6, 0) = 0
The Nash product is maximized when both the strong players ask for 4, and it
is minimized when both the active players ask for 6.
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Then, if each player i believes that his/her opponent j will choose `Ask for
4', and if i believes that j expects that i will choose `Ask for 4', the outcome
(Ask for 4, Ask for 4), will be an equilibrium of the game.6 Note, however, that
(Ask for 6, Ask for 6) is an equilibrium of the game when player i believes that
his/her opponent j will choose `Ask for 6' and i believes that j expects that i
will choose `Ask for 6'.
We start with a game in which only monetary payoﬀ is taken into account
and in which there is a unique Nash equilibrium (Ask for 6, Ask for 6). Then,
by introducing conformist preferences, we move to a new game, where payoﬀs
are characterized also by a deontological/conformist component and in which
there are two possible equilibria depending on the players' reciprocal beliefs.
One corresponds to the maximum degree of conformity with the principle of
distributive justice, while the other is the one in which the degree of conformity
is zero.
The solution of the game depends also on the value of the parameter λ. Given
the existence of beliefs coherent with reciprocal conformity, the stronger is the
players' disposition toward conformity with a shared principle of distributive
justice, the greater is λ and the higher is the probability that the outcome (Ask
for 4, Ask for 4) will be selected as the solution of the game.
5. The Experimental Evidence
In their experimental studies, Sacconi/Faillo (2010) (SF from now on) and
Faillo/Ottone/Sacconi (2008) (FOS from now on) compare the case in which
the Exclusion game is played without any further interaction between the sub-
jects with the case in which, before the subjects play the Exclusion Game, they
are given the possibility to agree on a non-binding fairness rule concerning the
division of a surplus between strong and weak players. The subjects know that
after the agreement they will play the Exclusion Game, but they do not know
with which roles they will do so. In substance, the subjects have to agree, under
a veil of ignorance, on what is the right way to play the game. The key question
that the two studies address is whether subjects, after having chosen a rule,
implement it in the game even when it prescribes a choice in contrast with the
pursuit of their material self-interest.
5.1 The SF Experiment
In the SF experiment participants played the basic version of the three-player
Exclusion Game (Figure 1 ) under two diﬀerent scenariosbefore and after the
agreement on a division rule.7
6 In this context, the appropriate notion of equilibrium is that of Psychological Nash Equi-
librium (Geanakoplos et al. 1989), which is an extension of the Nash equilibrium for situations
in which expectations enter the player's utility function.
7 In this synthesis of the two studies we will deliberately avoid discussing some of the more
technical features of the experiment. Interested readers will ﬁnd all the details in the original
papers.





















In phase 2, subjects were assigned to new groups consisting of three members, and they were invited to 
agree, by means of a voting procedure, upon a hypothetical rule for the allocation of a sum between 
two strong players and a weak player. The agreement was to be reached by repeatedly voting until 
unanimity was reached, within a limited number of trials. No explicit communication or mutual 
identification was allowed among the players of any given group. At the beginning of this phase, 
subjects were not assigned any specific role and were informed that in the following phase they would 
again play the game played in the first phase. They were requested to vote for one of two general 
principles and for one among some more specific rules deduced from the selected general principle 
(Figure 4). Subjects knew that the rule would not be binding. 
Groups had to reach a unanimous agreement by voting for the same principle within five trials before 
they could pass to the vote on the specific allocation rule, upon which the groups had to agree within 
ten trials. A lack of unanimity after the last of the trials would have prevented subjects from entering 
the third phase. 
The third and last phase started with the composition of the group unchanged and with the random 
assignment of Strong1, Strong2 and Strong3 roles to the members of each group that had agreed upon 
a given rule. 
PRINCIPLE 1. 
“Every player should share the 
benefits; in particular, the player 
who has not been able to choose 
should not receive less than others”. 
PRINCIPLE 2. 
“Players who play under a 
decisional role could claim a higher 
share of benefits”. 
   
G1  G2  G3 
1.1) 33% 25% 42% 
1.2) 25% 33% 42% 
1.3) 33% 33% 33% 
 
G1  G2  G3 
2.1) 50% 25% 17% 
2.2) 33% 50% 17% 











Figure 2: Second phase. Principles and rules (Sacconi/Faillo 2010)
The experiment consisted of three stages. In the ﬁrst stage subjects were divided
into groups of three and they were asked to play the Exclusion Game with
S=12 euros. Within each group, the roles of Strong1, Strong2 and Weak were
randomly assigned.8 Strong1 and Strong2 were invited to play the Exclusion
Game deciding how many of the 12 euros to ask for themselves and how many
to leave to Weak. In particular, the two strong players were able to choose
among three options: ask for 3 euros (1/4 of S), ask for 4 euros (1/3 of S) and
ask for 6 euros (1/2 of S).
Choices were made simultaneously.
Subjects played the game three times, in three diﬀerent rounds. At the be-
ginning of each round, the three roles were randomly re-assign d to the m mbe s
of the group. Each participant was able to take each of the three roles in turn.
At the end of the experiment, only one of these rounds was randomly selected,
and subjects' earnings for phase 1 were determined according to the outcome of
that round. The game was played anonymously and subjects were not aware of
the outcomes of previous rounds. This procedure produced two observations for
each player in this phase: his/her choice in the Strong1 role and his/her choice
in the Strong2 role.
In phase 2, subjects were assigned to new groups consisting of three members,
and they were invited to agree, by means of a voting procedure, upon a hypo-
thetical rule for the allocation of a sum between two strong players and a weak
player. The agreement was to be reached by repeatedly voting until unanimity
was reached, within a limited number of trials. No explicit communication or
8 In the experiment, the roles were given the names of G1, G2 and G3 and a more neutral
wording was used, distinguishing between `active' and `non-active' players instead of `strong'
and `weak' players.
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mutual identiﬁcation was allowed among the players of any given group. At the
beginning of this phase, subjects were not assigned any speciﬁc role and were
informed that in the following phase they would again play the game played in
the ﬁrst phase. They were requested to vote for one of two general principles
and for one among some more speciﬁc rules deduced from the selected general
principle (Figure 2 ). Subjects knew that the rule would not be binding.
Groups had to reach a unanimous agreement by voting for the same principle
within ﬁve trials before they could pass to the vote on the speciﬁc allocation rule,
upon which the groups had to agree within ten trials. A lack of unanimity after
the last of the trials would have prevented subjects from entering the third phase.
The third and last phase started with the composition of the group unchanged
and with the random assignment of Strong1, Strong2 and Strong3 roles to the
members of each group that had agreed upon a given rule.
Subjects played the same game that they had played in the ﬁrst phase, but now
strong players had the additional option of choosing between implementing the
rule that they had agreed in the second phase or choosing one of the alternative
strategies. Immediately after their choice, strong players were asked to express
their expectations about the opponent's willingness to implement the rule by
guessing the outcome of the game.9
To summarize, in the ﬁrst phase the three-player version of the Exclusion
Game was played. In the second phase, groups were rematched and subjects
voted for the rule. In the third phase, the veil of ignorance was removed and
strong players had to decide whether or not to comply with the rule. The main
comparison to be made in this experiment was that between the behaviour of
subjects in the ﬁrst phase and the behaviour of the same subjects in the third
phase.
5.2 The FOS Experiment
The FOS experiment was based on a diﬀerent designa so-called `between-
subject design' as opposed to the `within-subject' design adopted in the SF
experiment. The comparison in this case was made between the behaviours of
diﬀerent subjects taking part in diﬀerent treatments. In particular, the exper-
iment consisted of three treatments: the Baseline Treatment, the Agreement
Treatment and the Outsider Treatment.
All the treatments were based on a four-player version of the Exclusion Game
with a surplus S of 60 units of an experimental currency called `tokens'. Subjects
interacted in groups of four, and in each group there were three strong players
and one weak player. Strong players had to decide, simultaneously and indepen-
dently of each other, how much of S to ask by choosing one of the three options
available: ask for 15 tokens (25% of S), ask for 18 tokens (30% of S), or ask for
20 tokens (33% of S). In this version of the Exclusion Game the weak player was
completely excluded from the sharing of the surplus when all the three strong
players chose to ask for 20 tokens, while S was equally divided among all the
9 Subjects were asked to indicate the cell of the payoﬀ matrix in which s/he thought the
game would end.
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players (strong and weak) when all the strong players decided to ask only for 15
tokens.
In the Baseline Treatment participants simply played the basic four-player
version of the Exclusion Game.
In the Agreement Treatment participants were involved in a two-stage game.
In the ﬁrst stage, in each group each player, without knowing her/his role in
the game, was invited to vote for a speciﬁc allocation rule by choosing among
three options. This stage corresponded to the voting procedure under the veil of
ignorance, and it had the same characteristics as the procedure adopted in the
SF experiment. In this case, subjects had to vote for one of the following three
options (type A participants A1, A2 and A3 are the strong players of the group,
while participant B is the weak one):
Rule 1:
The division of the 60 tokens depends on the role of the participants.
In particular, Type A participants will receive a number of tokens
which is three times the number of tokens assigned to Type B partic-
ipants. This corresponds to the following division of the 60 tokens:
18 tokens for A1, 18 tokens for A2, 18 tokens for A3, 6 tokens for B.
Rule 2:
The division of the 60 tokens depends on the role of the participants.
In particular, the three Type A participants will receive the same
number of tokens; the Type B participant will receive zero tokens.
This corresponds to the following division of the 60 tokens: 20 tokens
for A1, 20 tokens for A2, 20 tokens for A3, 0 tokens for B.
Rule 3:
The division of the 60 tokens does not depend on the role of the par-
ticipants. Each participant will receive the same number of tokens.
This corresponds to the following division of the 60 tokens: 15 tokens
for A1, 15 tokens for A2, 15 tokens for A3, 0 tokens for B.
Players had to reach a unanimous agreement on the rule within 10 trials. The
rule was not binding, but only groups that unanimously voted for the same rule
in this ﬁrst stage would participate in the second stage.
In the second stage, without changing the composition of the groups, roles
were randomly assigned and the subjects played the four-player Exclusion Game.
Strong players could either decide to implement the rule selected in stage 1 or
choose one of the alternative allocations.
In the Outsider Treatment, the ﬁrst stage, as well as the rule on entering
the second stage, were the same as in the Agreement Treatment. But at the
beginning of the second stage, after the subjects had been assigned their role,
the groups were partially re-matched. In particular, a strong player for each
group (`the outsider') was reassigned to a diﬀerent group and informed about
the rule voted by her/his new group. The other members of the group hosting
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the outsider did not know what rule the outsider's previous group had adopted.
After the re-matching, the subjects played the four-player Exclusion Game.
In all the treatments, at the end of the game and before players were informed
about the other strong players' choices, ﬁrst-order and second-order normative
and empirical expectations were elicited by means of a brief questionnaire.10
In particular, in each group each strong player was asked to make statements
concerning:
1. the probabilities of each possible choice by co-strong players (First-Order
Empirical Expectations);
2. the probability of each co-strong player's possible judgement about his/her
own choicewhat the other strong player believed that s/he had chosen
(Second-Order Empirical Expectations);
3. the choice that s/he considered ought to be made in that particular situa-
tion (First-Order Normative Expectations);
4. the choice that co-players considered ought to be made (Second-Order
Normative Expectations).
In the Outsider Treatment, expectations about the behaviour and beliefs of
partners and outsiders were elicited separately.
5.3 Empirical Hypotheses
A set of empirical hypotheses can be derived by assuming that the motivations
of the subjects who participated in these two experiments can be described in
terms of conformist preferences.
Firstly, in regard to both experiments, we can expect that when the subjects
do not have the opportunity to agree on a rule for the division of the surplus
(ﬁrst phase of SF and Baseline Treatment of FOS) the ideal component of the
utility function is not active, since there is not a shared ideal to conform with.
Strong subjects have not reason to believe that the other strong subjects will
conform to any particular fairness principle. Hence the following hypothesis can
be put forward.
Hypothesis 1. When subjects have not the possibility to agree on a fairness rule
on how to play the Exclusion Gameas in the ﬁrst phase of SF and in the
Baseline Treatment of FOSthere is no reason to expect that they will play
diﬀerently from purely self-interested individuals. Consequently, in both exper-
iments they will choose to ask for the maximum6 euros in SF and 20 tokens
in FOS.
10 Only good guesses on Empirical Expectations were rewarded on the basis of a mechanism
known as the quadratic scoring rule (Davis/Holt 1993) which assigns a payoﬀ that depends
positively on the probability assigned to the event that actually occurs.
302 Lorenzo Sacconi, Marco Faillo and Stefania Ottone
With regard to the agreement phase, in both the treatments, when the subjects
have to choose the rule under the veil of ignorance, it could be expected that the
majority of them will opt for the rule that prescribes the equal division of the
surplus. The voting phase mimics a typical constitutional choice of a fairness
principle which, according to a contractarian approach, will induce participants
to assume an impartial perspective. They will judge the outcomes of the game
from the point of view of each role, and they will choose a rule acceptable from
whichever point of view. This implies a solution invariant to the permutation
of the individual point of view, like the one in which the surplus is equally di-
vided. Furthermore, in this setting, the equal division of the surplus is also the
intuitively obvious choicethe most salient one. Given that the agreement is
a necessary condition for accessing to the next phase, players may vote for the
most salient rule in order to coordinate within the maximum number of trials.
Hypothesis 2 follows.
Hypothesis 2. In both the experiments, in the pre-play agreement phasesecond
phase of SF and ﬁrst phase of the Agreement and Outsider Treatments of FOS
the majority of subjects will choose the rule that prescribes the equal division
of the surplus.
According to conformist preferences, the subjects will comply if i) they are part
of the group that has chosen the rule; ii) they believe that other members of
their group will comply (First Order Empirical Expectations compatible with
the choice dictated by the rule) and if iii) they believe that other members of
the group expect that they will comply (Second Order Empirical Expectations
compatible with the choice dictated by the rule). In FS one should expect to
ﬁnd that strong subjects complying with the rule are those who expect that the
game will end in the cell of the payoﬀ matrix compatible with mutual compliance
with the rule. In FOS, in the Agreement Treatment, one would expect strong
subjects to comply if they believe both that other strong subjects will comply
(ﬁrst order empirical expectations) and that the other strong players will expect
them to comply (second order empirical expectations). In the Outsider Treat-
ment, groups playing the Exclusion Game are formed by both insidersthose
who voted the ruleand outsidersthose who participated in the voting pro-
cedure in another group. One should expect to ﬁnd a lower level of compliance
in the Outsider Treatment with respect to the Agreement Treatment because
outsiders are not part of the group which has chosen the rule and insiders do
not have any reason to believe that outsiders will comply with the rule, hence
they will not comply. The following hypothesis can be put forward
Hypothesis 3. In both the experiments, strong players comply with the agreed
rule only if they expect that the other strong players of their group comply as
well.
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5.4 Empirical Results11
Overall, 366 undergraduate students took part in the experiments (150 in the
FS and 216 in the FOS).12 In the SF experiment, during the ﬁrst stage, all
participants played twice as strong players, while in the third stage only 3/4 of
the subjects played as strong players (the remaining 1/4 were selected as weak
players and they did not have any decisional power). Consequently, we observed
choices of 150 subjects in the ﬁrst stage (2 observations for each player) and
of 100 subjects in the third stage. All 150 players participated in the voting
procedure.
In the FOS experiment, 56 players were recruited for the Baseline Treatment,
72 for the Agreement Treatment, and 88 for the Outsider Treatment. We had
observations of 42 strong players in the Baseline Treatment, 54 in the Agreement
Treatment, and 66 in the Outsider Treatment. The preferred rule was signalled
by all 216 players.
Result 1. In both the experiments, in the absence of an ex-ante impartial agree-
ment most subjects behaved in a self-interested way.
In SF, in the ﬁrst stage, 59.3% of players always asked for the maximum amount,
while 26.7% chose the self-interested strategy at least once. In FOS, in the
Baseline Treatment, 73.8% of strong players chose to ask for the highest amount
of tokens (20).
These ﬁndings are in line with Hypothesis 1.
Result 2. In both the experiments, when agreement was possible, it was reached
by all groups. Moreover, almost all groups agreed on the equal division rule.
As we expected (Hypothesis 2 ), in both the experiments agreement was always
reached. This is not surprising since agreement was not binding but failure to
reach it was costly, because it prevented access to the following phase. However,
the interesting point is that, as we expected, the egalitarian distribution rule
seems to have been a focal point. In particular, in SF, 64% of subjects chose
the egalitarian rule (32 out of 50 groups), while in FOS, 17 groups out of 18 in
the Agreement Treatment and 20 out of 22 in the Outsider Treatment chose the
fair-division rule.
11 All these results have been tested with statistical and econometric techniques. For details
see Sacconi/Faillo 2010 and Faillo/Ottone/Sacconi 2008.
12 150 subjects participated in Experiment 1 and 216 in Experiment 2. All 10 sessions of
Experiment 1 were run in Trento (CEELUniversity of Trento), while Experiment 2 was run
both in Milan (EELABUniversity of Milan Bicocca) and Trento. In particular, 3 sessions
were run for the Baseline Treatment (1 in Milan and 2 in Trento), 4 sessions for the Agreement
Treatment (2 in Milan and 2 in Trento), 5 sessions for the Outsider Treatment (3 in Milan and
2 in Trento).
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Result 3. In both experiments, we observe a high degree of compliance with the
selected rule. In addition, strong players complied if they expected compliance
also by the other strong players of their group.
When we analyse players' choices after the agreement stage, we ﬁnd a high degree
of compliance with the non-binding rule selected. In particular, in SF, 77% of
subjects decided to comply with the chosen rule when playing the Exclusion
Game, while in Experiment 2, 50% of players in the Agreement Treatment and
39.4% in the Outsider Treatment did so.
In accordance with Hypothesis 3, strong subjects who complied with the rule
expected that the other strong subjects of their group would comply and would
expect them to comply.
In addition, in both the experiments, for a signiﬁcant percentage of subjects,
agreement on a fairness rule seems to have been a suﬃcient condition for the
emergence of expectations of reciprocal conformity. This can be considered a
pure empirical result. Conformist preferences theory predicts compliance when
the weight of the ideal component (lambda) is suﬃciently high and reciprocal
expectations of compliance exist. But the theory is silent with regard to the
origin of these expectations. The experimental evidence seem to suggest that
the impartial agreement is itself the source of reciprocal beliefs of compliance.
In SF and in the Agreement Treatment of FOS, strong players who were parts
of groups that had chosen a particular rule tended to comply because, since they
had reached an impartial agreement on that speciﬁc rule, they believed that the
other strong players would comply with the rule and would expect them to
comply. Since in both experiments most of the groups agreed on the equal
division rule, this resulted in a signiﬁcantly smaller percentage of selﬁsh choices
in the cases in which an impartial agreement had been reached.
A detailed account of this process can be provided for the FOS experiment,
where the data on expectations are more accurate. On comparing empirical
expectations in the Baseline Treatment and in the Agreement Treatment of FOS,
it is clear that the agreement inﬂuenced the players' beliefs. In the Baseline
Treatment 88% of subjects expected that the other strong players in the group
would ask for the maximum amount (20 tokens). In the Agreement Treatment,
17 groups out of 18 chose the fair rule, according to which each strong player
should ask for 15 tokens. On analysing the subjects' expectations, we ﬁnd that in
the Agreement Treatment there is a signiﬁcant decrease of subjects who thought
that the other members of their group had asked for 20 tokensonly 40%.
At this point, a more sophisticated process emerges. The relationship be-
tween agreement and choice can be described in two steps. Step 1: the agreement
inﬂuenced the players' empirical expectations. Step 2: empirical expectations
deﬁned the subjects' choices. This means that the diﬀerence between the Base-
line Treatment and the Agreement Treatment is a consequence of the impact of
the agreement on players' beliefs and preferences.
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To sum up, we can say that the agreement leads to a convergence of em-
pirical expectations on the fair rule and these expectations inﬂuence subjects'
decisions.13
Result 4. In the Outsider Treatment of FOS a lower percentage of players com-
plied with the chosen rule with respect to the Agreement Treatment.
In FOS, when the Exclusion Game was played in groups where one subject was
an `outsider' (in the Outsider Treatment), a lower percentage of players complied
with the chosen rule.
This result seems to conﬁrm that having reached an impartial agreement on
the rule with the members of her/his own group was a necessary condition for
a subject to comply with that rule. When groups were rematched and one of
the strong players (the outsider) was assigned to a new group, the members of
his/her new group (the insiders) did not expect compliance from him/her, and
consequently they did not comply. The outsider seemed to acknowledge this,
and, on expecting non-compliance by the insiders, s/he did not comply.
The same two-step process described above can explain the evidence on the
Outsider Treatment. When we analyse subjects' expectation of compliance, it
turns out that this value is higher in the Agreement Treatment than in the Out-
sider Treatment46% against 27%. This means that, once again, the diﬀerence
between the Agreement Treatment and the Outsider Treatment is a consequence
of the impact of the outsider on players' beliefs. Step 1: the introduction of
an outsider inﬂuences the players' empirical expectations. Step 2: empirical ex-
pectations deﬁne the subjects' choices. If we analyse expectations and choices
in both treatments, it turns out that in the Outsider Treatment subjects were
more likely to expect deviation by the co-players from the chosen rule and these
expectations of compliance inﬂuence subjects' decisions.
6. Conclusion
To conclude, let us explain how our experiment is consistent with a Rawlsian
perspective on norm compliance (see conditions at the end of section 2), and how
we are also able to explain the reciprocal belief formation necessary for selection
of the `compliance-with-the-principle' behavior (a point that we discussed in the
introduction on the equilibrium selection approach to the compliance problem,
but which is relevant here in terms of selection of the psychological equilibrium
inducing full conformity with the principles of justice).
The participants in the experiment were young people (students at the Uni-
versity of Trento and Milan), who had grown up in the context of a nearly well-
ordered society, wherein they had experienced the functioning of at least some
lower-level nearly-just institutions like the family or associations. Through these
13 When analysing the correlation between choices and expectations, it turns out that actions
and beliefs are in line. Moreover, a more sophisticated econometric analysis conﬁrms both
steps.
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experiences they had developedto some extentthe capacity to form a sense
of justice (in our model represented by the extent of the parameter λ). Nonethe-
less, when confronted with the exclusion game without the opportunity to choose
the principles of division impartially, they still did not perform the mental ex-
periment of an impartial justiﬁcation of whatever solution. Hence they acted
according to their self-interest. When the agreement in both the experiments
was to be reached, however, the subjects performed the experiment of being put
under a veil of ignorance in order to agree on a principle of distributive justice;
that concerns then not because they are assured about the enforceability of the
agreement, but simply because in agreeing they share the simple intent of giving
each of them the chance to participate in the following non-cooperative game.
Agreeing on a principle/rule is similar to taking part in a constitutional decision.
The constitution mattered to the participants not because it provided binding
commitments but simply because it gave them a chance to participate in a po-
tentially beneﬁcial game only if they reached an anonymous agreement on the
principle/rule. Once the agreement had been stipulated, they were entirely free
to violate it, but they were also in the position to beneﬁt from each other in so
far as the agreement gave an opportunity to play the exclusion game.
In the experiments, when the subjects entered the exclusion game stage after
having agreed on some principle of distributive justice, they found themselves in
a situation that Rawls would have recognized as a well-ordered society in which,
because they had developed the capacity to form a sense of justice, and because
they realized that principles had been chosen under the veil of ignorance, they
should have been able to comply with principles of justice. We can check whether
the experiment conveyed evidence favorable to the idea of a sense of justice or
in other wordswhether the experiment satisﬁed Rawls's hypothesis (see section
2 ) and engendered behavior consistent with the idea of the emergence of a sense
of justice.
Consider the players who agreed on the egalitarian principle/rule. All of
them, within their own group, knew that the others had made the same choice,
i.e. under a Rawlsian interpretation that they all justiﬁed the same course of
action under a veil of ignorance. In fact, they took no more than a very few
voting rounds to agree on that principle/rule in stage two of the ﬁrst experiment
and in the agreement treatment of the second experiment.
What about the shared knowledge that the opponents' eﬀective behavior was
beneﬁcial to each single member of the group and which is necessary in order to
elicit reciprocity? At this point players could not rely on the evidence of a long
past history of norm compliance. Nevertheless, most of those who agreed on an
egalitarian principle/rule also believed that their opponents would conform (as
far as the agreement treatment is concerned). This suggests that the agreement
under a veil of ignorance may by itself have a strong causal eﬀect on shaping
reciprocal expectations.
This is not implicit in the conformist preference model, but is a natural
consequence of the veil of ignorance reasoning format, which accords with the
idea of default reasoning, and receives surprisingly strong evidence from the
experiment. In order to make sense of this fact, it is important to realize that
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there is no logical necessity in the inference from the ex ante agreement to
the expectation of de facto compliance by other participants in the stage two
agreement. On the contrary, this involves a cognitive mechanism known as
default reasoning (Reiter 1980; Bacharach 1994; Sacconi/Moretti 2008). The
idea is simply that if each player has actually adopted an unanimous impartial
agreement in the ex ante perspective, then s/he will acquire at least the mental
model of a decision maker who acts in accordance with a plan whose content
coincides with the terms of the agreed course of action. Agreeing on a set of
actions to be carried out later implies having a mental representation of an agent
carrying out a plan of actionwhich is simply the content of the statement of
agreement.
A normally rational agent cannot fail to have this mental model because it is
derived from introspection, and because the player him/herself is an exemplar of
an agent who has planned to act in accordance with the content of the statement
of agreement later on. But then consider that mental models are necessarily used
in order to ﬁgure out possible situations and predict them. And hypothesize
that at this point in time no framing of an agent `comes to the players' mind'
(Bacharach 2006) other than the mental model of an agent who will act according
to the content of the agreement. If no contrary evidence is forthcoming, the
only way an agent can simulate the other players' choice is to resort by default
to his/her own mental model of a rational agent. By default, then, the same
mental model is used to simulate every players' reasoning and behavior. This
simulation may be recursive, so that a player uses his/her mental model not
only to predict another player's behavior but also in order to simulate the other
player's reasoning and beliefs, so that a shared mental model of all the rational
agents is formed such that they are all expected to conform with the terms
of agreement. The treatment with outsiders conﬁrms this line of reasoning.
When players were informed that there were members of the group playing the
exclusion game who had not agreed on the principle, a diﬀerent frame of a
rational player came to the players' mindi.e. a frame such that an agent may
not act according to the content of the agreement because she has not taken part
in agreeing on it. In fact, in this case the ﬁrst-order and second-order beliefs
about other players' conformity break down, and as a consequence also the level
of behavioral conformity is sharply reduced.
This explainsif not logically justiﬁeswhy the agent (as long as there is no
proof to the contrary) may frame the case as a situation wherein agents conform
with the norm. The ex ante agreement on a principle of fairness allows by default
the formation of a prior belief that the propositional content of the mental model
representing an agent discharging his/her commitments to an agreement is true.
Just after the agreement there is no evidence that any player will not conform,
whereas there is the intuitive evidence of the mental representation of an agent
who agrees to a principle and hence expresses at least at that point in time
the commitment to carry out a certain behavior later on. Although it would
be excessive to say that this completely resolves the players' prior uncertainty,
it explains how, after an agreement has been worked outin so far as it is
understood as being a constitutional, fair, initial (ab origine) agreement under
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the `veil of ignorance'the model of a compliant agent `comes to their minds'
with most vividness.
The result is that, in both of the experiments considered, also the fourth
condition for a `sense of justice' was satisﬁed in the case of the groups choosing
the egalitarian rule of division (the `agreement treatment' in the second exper-
iment): not only were their members exogenously capable of it, they agreed on
a principle of justice under the veil of ignorance and had shared knowledge that
they all agreed, but they also had the shared belief that they were all behaving
in a way that was impartially beneﬁcial to each other. It follows that, if Rawls
is right, those subjects who satisﬁed these assumptionsthose who belonged to
the group choosing the egalitarian rule in the ﬁrst experiment and those who did
the same in the agreement treatment of the secondshould show the formation
of a sense of justice suﬃciently strong to induce them to comply with the rule
chosen. Which in fact was veriﬁed by our experimental evidence.
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